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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF INDEMNITY CLAUSES
Indemnity clauses are found in most construction and maintenance
contracts, and are sometimes referred to as "hold harmless" agreements.'
In fact, indemnity clauses are standard provisions in the model contract
forms of the American Institute of Architects and the Engineer's Joint
Contract Documents Committee. 2 They are used primarily as a means
of allocating the risks of a project among the parties involved. Without
these contractual provisions, those risks might be apportioned years later
by a jury acting on "equitable" grounds.3 By fixing liability at the time
of the contract, the parties can anticipate the scope of their obligations
and plan accordingly. Thus, each party can obtain the proper amount
of insurance and accurately calculate his costs of the venture.
Indemnity clauses are a constant source of litigation in Louisiana.
A typical indemnity clause provides:
Contractor agrees to defend, indemnify and hold harmless com-
pany, its officers and employees, from and against any and all
claims and causes of action and all losses on account of any
personal injury or death or property damage arising out of or
in any way related to the performance of the Contractor or any
sub-contractor of the Contractor of services hereunder. 4
Indemnity clauses take one of three general forms, varying only in
the amount of responsibility assumed by the contractor. In the basic
indemnity clause, the contractor/indemnitor agrees to bear the cost of
defending any suit and paying any judgment against the owner/indem-
nitee arising out of any negligent acts or omissions of the contractor.
In other agreements, the contractor also agrees to take responsibility
for any damages arising from the concurrent negligence of the owner
and the contractor. Finally, in the broadest form of indemnity clause,
the contractor agrees to assume responsibility for, all damage, even that
caused solely by the owner's negligence.
Problems often arise because the indemnity clause fails to clearly
indicate which level of liability the contractor has assumed. In the absence
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Similar clauses are found in many types of contracts. This paper focuses on a
line of cases involving the relationship between owners and contractors.
2. 3 S. Stein, Construction Law 13.17, at 13-122 (1986).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Polozola v. Garlock, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1009 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979),
writ denied, 379 So. 2d 1103 (La. 1980); Arnold v. Stupp Corp., 205 So. 2d 797 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1967), writ denied, 251 La. 936, 207 So. 2d 540 (1968).
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of express language, the intent of the parties shall prevail. However,
deriving the intent of the parties from these indemnity clauses has been
no easy task for the Louisiana courts. At the center of the dispute rests
the phrase "any and all claims." Does this language indicate an intent
on the part of the contractor to indemnify the owner against liability
based on the owner's concurrent negligence with the contractor, the sole
negligence of the owner, and even the strict liability of the owner? This
article discusses how Louisiana courts have answered these questions.
Indemnification From An Indemnitee's Own Negligence
In deciding whether indemnification from "any and all claims"
includes the right of an indemnitee to be indemnified from its own
negligent acts, jurisprudence in various states has led to the evolution
of a majority and a minority view. The majority view can best be stated
as follows: A contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify
the indemnitee against losses resulting through his negligent acts where
such intention is not expressed in unequivocal terms.' This interpretation
is based on the assumption that "any and all claims" is a general term
which fails to indicate an intent to impose "an obligation so extraor-
dinary and harsh" that the indemnitor will be held liable for the sole
negligence of the indemnitee.6 On the other hand, the minority view
takes the position that the words "any and all claims" are unambiguous
and evidence a clear intent to indemnify the indemnitee from any claim
against it, including one based on the indemnitee's sole negligence. 7
The minority view certainly possesses a-textual appeal; "all claims"
means "all," not "some." The very broad and sweeping language of
these indemnity clauses manifests a clear intention of the parties to
provide for indemnification against every conceivable claim, including
the indemnitee's negligence. The indemnitee's position can be summarized
as follows: "Before I allow you, the Contractor, on my land to perform
services, I want your assurance that you will indemnify me from any
claims made upon me arising out of the work you are performing,
regardless of who is to blame." If the "any and all claims" language
in the indemnity clause evidences the parties' intention as interpreted
by the minority view, then that meaning of the language should be "the
law between the parties and subject to judicial recognition and enforce-
ment." 8
5. 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 15, at 700 (1968); 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 12, at
580 (1944).
6. Arnold v. Stupp Corp., 205 So. 2d 797, 799 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), writ
denied, 251 La. 936, 207 So. 2d 540 (1968).
7. Id. See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Smith & Oby
Co., 272 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 1959).
8. Arnold, 205 So. 2d at 799.
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Despite the appeal of the minority view, Louisiana has adopted the
majority view partially due to policy considerations and the difficulty
of determining whether both parties to the contract intended the broad
interpretation under the minority view. In Arnold v. Stupp Corp.,9 the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal discussed both the minority
and majority views, and held that Louisiana was committed to the
latter.'0 In Mills v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.," a federal district court
held that contracts providing indemnification from an indemnitee's own
acts of negligence "are disfavored to the extent that they will not be
enforced unless the terms of the agreement clearly require such inter-
pretation."' 2 In Strickland v. Nutt, 3 the first circuit reaffirmed the
Arnold court's commitment to the majority view and extended the
rationale to situations involving the concurrent negligence of the indem-
nitee and indemnitor. 4 The Louisiana Supreme Court followed Arnold
by holding that an indemnity contract purporting to indemnify one from
his own negligence will be strictly construed; thus, such indemnification
will not be allowed unless the intention was expressed in "unequivocal
terms." 5
9. 205 So. 2d 797 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), writ denied, 251 La. 936, 207 So. 2d
540 (1968) (employee of the contractor fell from a ladder while replacing a bolt on
manufacturer's premises).
10. The court cited several cases in support of its conclusion: Brady v. American
Ins. Co., 198 So. 2d 907 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Moore v. Liberty Mut. .Ins. Co.,
149 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Dorman v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 55 So. 2d
587 (La. App. Orl. 1951), aff'd, 223 La. 29, 64 So. 2d 833 (1953); Buford v. Sewerage
& Water Bd. of New Orleans, 175 So. 110 (La. App. Orl. 1937); Motor Sales & Serv.
v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 15 La. App. 353, 131 So. 623 (Orl. 1930).
11. 226 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. La. 1964), aff'd sub nom., Yuba Consol. Indus. v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 338 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1964).
12. Id. at 790.
13. 264 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 262 La. 1124, 266 So. 2d 432
(1972). In Strickland, an employee of the contractor was killed in a collision with a boat
belonging to the master. The court found the contractor's employee and the master's
employee to be concurrently negligent. The master was denied indemnification under the
"any and all claims" language of the contract.
14. Id. at 323. The court in Strickland cited Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.
v. Mobile Drilling Barge, 424 F.2d 684 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832, 91 S. Ct.
65 (1970), for support of its conclusion that where, as in Strickland, the indemnitee and
the indemnitor are concurrently negligent, the rule of strict interpretation of the indemnity
clause still applies.
15. Polozola v. Garlock, Inc., 343 So. 2d 1000 (La. 1977). The Polozola litigation
produced a series of reported opinions, all of which are discussed in this paper. In
Polozola v. Garlock, Inc., 334 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976) (hereinafter "Polozola
/"), the first circuit held that an indemnity clause containing the words "whether caused
by Dow's negligence or otherwise" did not entitle Dow's employees to indemnification.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Polozola v. Garlock, Inc., 343 So. 2d 1000 (La. 1977)
(hereinafter "Polozola IF'), reversed the first circuit, holding that this language included
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Equitable considerations require the strict interpretation that the
courts have given to these indemnity clauses. If the indemnitee is allowed
indemnification from his own negligence, a great burden is placed upon
the indemnitor. The indemnitor is usually in no position to prevent the
risk by controlling the conduct of the indemnitee, yet he is assuming
the liability. This extreme burden should not be imposed upon an
indemnitor absent an unequivocal finding that the risk was expressly
bargained for and accepted. Also, if the indemnitee is allowed to easily
shift his burden of due care to the indemnitor, the situation "may
encourage antisocial acts and a relaxation of vigilance toward the rights
of others by relieving the wrongdoer of liability for his conduct."' 6
Louisiana courts will therefore presume that no intent exists to
indemnify an indemnitee against losses resulting from his own negligent
acts in the absence of unequivocal intention to the contrary. 7 Since the
language "any and all claims" is not considered unequivocal under the
majority rule of interpretation, the Louisiana courts have used the Civil
Code articles governing construction of contracts 8 to determine the intent
of the parties. 9
Given this strict interpretation requiring an unequivocal intent to
indemnify an indemnitee from his negligent acts, it is not surprising
that Louisiana courts have been reluctant to find that the parties entered
into such an agreement. In Polozola 111,20 the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal noted that indemnity agreements fall into three general
categories: (1) those that specify that the indemnitor will indemnify the
indemnitee from his own negligence;2' (2) those that specify that the
indemnitor will not indemnify the indemnitee from his own negligence; 22
and (3) those that are silent on that issue, but contain other language
that might be so construed. As to those agreements in the first category,
a court should have no problem finding a clear, unequivocal intent that
the indemnitor indemnify for the indemnitee's negligence. 23 The courts
are reluctant to do so, however, in instances of category three agreements
Dow's employees. The first circuit dealt with another indemnity agreement between Dow
and a second contractor/indemnitor in Polozola v. Garlock, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1009 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1979), writ denied, 379 So. 2d 1103 (La. 1980) (hereinafter "Polozola III").
16. Soverign Ins. Co. v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 488 So. 2d 982, 986 (La. 1986).
17. Soverign, 488 So. 2d at 986, citing Polozola II. The Soverign Court also refered
to La. Civ. Code art. 1852, which states that a presumption not established by law is
left to the discretion of the court.
18. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2045-2057.
19. See, e.g., Soverign, 488 So. 2d at 984-86; Polozola H, 343 So. 2d at 1003.
20. 376 So. 2d 1009, 1014 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
21. See, e.g., Polozola II, 343 So. 2d at 1003, Lee v. Allied Chem. Corp., 331 So.
2d 608 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 337 So. 2d 525 (La. 1976).
22. See, e.g., Green v. Taca Int'l Airlines, 304 So. 2d 357 (La. 1974).
23. See Polozola II, 343 So. 2d at 1003.
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which fail to specifically mention indemnification for the indemnitee's
negligence.
While the Polozola II rule of strict interpretation requires an une-
quivocal intent to indemnify an indemnitee from his own negligence,2 4
it does not require express language stating such an intent. In Lee v.
Allied Chemical Corp., 25 the court held that "the absence of the words
'negligence of the indemnitees' is evidence of the intent not to cover
such negligence." ' 26 However, the court noted, "the real question posed
is that of the intent of the parties, and the intent so to cover has been
found even in absence of the magic words." ' 27 In Hyde v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc.,28 the court agreed that: 'Louisiana does not require a
specific reference to negligent acts in order for an indemnity agreement
* to cover claims based on negligent acts. However, the intention of
the parties, as inferred from the language of their agreement, must
clearly indicate an intention to include negligent acts .... ,,,29 While
Lee and Hyde indicate that there can be an intent to indemnify for
acts of negligence in the absence of "the magic words," 30 relatively few
cases have actually imposed such liability.
One such case is Jennings v. Ralston Purina Co.." in which the
court found an intent for the indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee
from its own negligence. The indemnity clause provided:
Contractor shall protect, indemnify and hold harmless Com-
pany from any loss, damage, liability and expense for all injuries,
including death to persons or damage to property directly or
24. See supra text accompanying note 17.
25. 331 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976). In Lee, an employee of the indemnitor/
contractor was injured by a fall caused by unsafe working conditions. He sued the
indemnitee/owner and seven of its employees. These parties sought indemnification from
the contractor under a clause purporting to indemnify the owner for damage caused by
the owner's own negligence.
26. Id. at 611..
27. Id.
28. 697 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1983). In Hyde, an employee of the contractor was injured
when he fell on a defectively welded staircase on an oil platform belonging to the operator.
At issue was whether a broad form indemnity clause indemnified the operator from its
strict liability.
29. Id. at 633 (quoting Battig v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 482 F. Supp.
338, 343-44 (W.D. La. 1977), aff'd, 608 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1979)).
30. The statements in Lee and Hyde on this issue are dicta. Lee dealt with a clause
that expressly included indemnity for the indemnitee's negligence, while Hyde dealt with
indemnification for the indemnitee's strict liability.
31. 201 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 251 La. 215, 203 So. 2d 554
(1967). Jennings, the plaintiff, was an employee of the indemnitor, which was installing
a roof on an addition to the indemnitee's loading shed. The roof became wet due to the
negligence of the indemnitee's employees in washing down the upper portions of the plant
walls. Jennings slid off of the roof and was severely injured.
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indirectly arising or growing out of the performance of this
Contract except loss or damage that is recoverable under Com-
pany's fire and extended coverage insurance. Contractor shall
hold Company harmless from and shall answer and defend any
action instituted against Company for any loss, damage-or injury
sustained by any person resulting from the performance of this
Contract.
Contractor shall carry and maintain such liability insurance
as will protect Contractor and Company from claims under any
workmen's compensation acts and from any other damages ...
sustained by [anyone] due to the performance of this Contract.2
The court concluded that the contract revealed a "clearly quoted,
specifically stated and thoroughly comprehensive obligation on the part
of the [indemnitor] to indemnify [the indemnitee] against any damage
or injury arising out of the performance of the contract" regardless of
any negligence on the part of Ralston, the indemnitee."
This decision appears to follow the minority rule;3 4 however, the
court in Jennings stated that it had "no quarrel" with the general
majority rule of strict construction." Indeed, instead of being identified
as representative of the minority view, Jennings has been distinguished
factually on the basis of contract language. According to Arnold v.
Stupp Corp., the general language in the first paragraph of the Jennings
contract ("from any loss") must be considered in light of the specific
exclusion "except loss or damage that is recoverable under Company's
fire and extended coverage insurance."'3 6 The Arnold court also noted
the contract clause requiring the contractor to carry insurance to protect
both the contractor and the company from workmen's compensation
claims and from any other damages. The court took the position that
this specific clause excepting damage for which the indemnitee was
insured evidenced an intent to indemnify the indemnitee from all other
causes, including those resulting from the consequences of its own neg-
ligence. The fact that the indemnitor was required to carry insurance
for workmen's compensation claims and "any other damages" also
supported the conclusion that the indemnitor was to be held responsible
for the indemnitee's negligence. The Arnold court noted: "To hold
otherwise would in effect be saying that Jennings represents a conscious
departure from the majority view . . .- 7
32. Id. at 174.
33. Id. at 175.
34. See supra text accompanying note 7.
35. Jennings, 201 So. 2d at 175.
36. 205 So. 2d 797, 803 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
37. Id.
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In Polozola I1I,3 the court again looked to the intent of the parties
rather than the mere presence of a specific reference to the indemnitee's
negligence. The court cited Jennings, and then concluded that "each
agreement must be interpreted according to its intended meaning, and
that the absence of a specific reference to the indemnitee's 'negligence'
is not decisive either way." 39
Asserting four reasons in support of its conclusion, the court in
Polozola III held that the parties intended for the indemnitor to in-
demnify from the consequences of the indemnitee's own negligence.
First, the language of the indemnity clause was broad and general. The
indemnitor agreed to indemnify 'from and against any and all claims
and causes of action and all losses therefrom, arising out of or in any
way related to the performance' by the indemnitor under the contract,
'including without limitation"' any claims for personal injury made
by the indemnitor's employees. 40 The contract proceeded to state that
the duty to indemnify extended to 'any and all claims made against
[the indemnitee] by any employees of [the indemnitor] ... arising from
any source.'' 41 The court found the language of the Dow-Weise in-
demnity clause to be "if anything, broader than" the Jennings clause. 42
As for the cases holding these clauses not to include indemnification
from the indemnitee's own negligence, the court stated that the present
agreement was "certainly distinguishable. '43
38. 376 So. 2d 1009 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979). Polozola, employed by the contractor/
indemnitor, suffered severe injuries while performing work at a plant owned by Dow,
the indemnitee. The court found that the accident occurred due to the failure of three
Dow employees to equip a pipeline with a proper safety pressure release mechanism. The
indemnity clause provided:
Contractor agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Dow, its officers and
employees, from and against any and all claims and causes of action and all
losses therefrom, arising out of or in any way related to the performance by
Contractor or any sub-contractor of Contractor of services hereunder, including
without limitation any such claims for personal injury or death or property
damage or destruction urged by employees of Dow, employees of Contractor,
any sub-contractor, and employees of any sub-contractor of Contractor, or all
third parties whomsoever. This indemnity obligation of Contractor shall further
extend to and include any and all claims made against Dow by any employees
of Contractor or any sub-contractor or any employee of any sub-contractor,
arising from any source while any such party is on premises owned, operated,
leased or controlled by Dow.
Id. at 1014.
39. Id. at 1014-15.
40. Id. at 1015.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The distinguishable cases cited were the following: Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson
Chem. Corp., 429 F. d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970); Breaux v. Rimmer & Garrett, Inc., 320
So. 2d 214 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Arnold v. Stupp Corp., 205 So. 2d 797 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1967).
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Second, the court noted that other portions of the agreement in-
dicated an intent to indemnify the indemnitee from its own negligence."
The indemnitor was bound to acquire certain insurance policies that
would cover its indemnity obligations. The Jennings court found that
a similar clause indicated an intent for the indemnitor to protect against
the indemnitee's negligence. 4' Also, under the contract, the insurance
underwriters of the contractor were required to waive "subrogation
against [the indemnitee] and its underwriters.' '46 The court concluded
that this phrase was senseless unless the parties intended that the in-
demnitor bear the consequences of the indemnitee's negligence. 47
The third reason was that the indemnitee had another contract with
a second maintenance company that specifically included indemnification
for the indemnitee's negligence. 4 The indemnitee paid both contractors
the same percentage over wages to cover overhead, insurance, and profit.
The court felt that this indicated an intent to indemnify the indemnitee
from its own negligence because if no such intent were present, the
indemnitee certainly would not have paid an identical percentage to two
contractors assuming "decidedly different risks." ,49
Fourth, the court stated that the contract involved sophisticated
parties who could have easily written a contract that clearly excluded
indemnification from the owner's negligence. In fact, the court noted
that the indemnitor had such a contract with another large chemical
corporation.50
The court concluded that "Weise and Dow agreed that Weise would
indemnify Dow in the circumstances which prevailed in the instant case.
The purpose of the indemnity agreement, considered as a whole, was
to make Weise liable for matters within its orbit of responsibility." 1
Under current Louisiana jurisprudence, a clear unequivocal intent
is required before a court will enforce an indemnity agreement purporting
to indemnify the indemnitee from his own acts of negligence. 2 However,
as the Jennings v. Ralston Purina Co. and Polozola III decisions indicate,
44. The court examined other provisions of the agreement on the authority of La.
Civ. Code art. 1955 (1870).
45. Polozola 11, 376 So. 2d at 1015.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Dow had a contract with National Maintenance Corporation for similar work.
This contract was the subject of the other two Polozola decisions. See supra note 15.
49. Polozola III, 376 So. 2d at 1016.
50. Id. The court noted a contract between the indemnitor and Shell Chemical
Corporation for work in the same general area, citing Pearson v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 345 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 347 So. 2d 255-56 (La.
1977).
51. Polozola. III, 376 So. 2d at 1016.
52. Arnold v. Stupp Corp., 205 So. 2d 797, 799-803 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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"unequivocal" does not necessarily require express reference to negli-
gence of the indemnitee. The courts have been reluctant, nevertheless,
to imply an intent to indemnify an indemnitee from its own negligence
in the absence of express language. Policy considerations dictate that
the general words "any and all liability" alone are insufficient to support
such an intent.
In the absence of express language, an attorney should point out
other language and facts that evidence the required unequivocal intent.
Jennings and Polozola III best exemplify this technique. If, as in Po-
lozola III, the clause includes several broad, inclusive phrases besides
the "any and all claims" language, it can be argued that the requisite
intent is present. Also, if the contract requires the indemnitor to carry
insurance for the benefit of the indemnitee, an intent to indemnify from
the indemnitee's own negligence may be implied.
The argument that the parties "should have known how to write,
and could have written, a contract which would have specifically excluded
coverage by [indemnitor] of the consequences of [indemnitee's]
negligence" 53 is not persuasive. A contract to specifically include coverage
could have been formed just as easily.
Certain indemnity agreements have been legislatively declared null
and void, and against the public policy of the state. 54 The legislature,
however, has given no indication of its attitude towards other indemnity
agreements. Indeed, indemnification from one's own acts of negligence
is anything but disfavored. As the court noted in Jennings: "To hold
that a party cannot protect itself through indemnification or insurance
against liability for its own negligent acts would ... do violence to
well established authority . . . . 5 Indemnification from one's own acts
of negligence forms the underlying basis of the entire insurance industry.
Certainly it is understandable that an owner would want a contractor
to agree to bear the risk of matters within its orbit of responsibility
and control.
Indemnification From One's Own Strict Liability
Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed indemnification
from one's own strict liability. Soverign Insurance Co. v. Texas Pipeline
53. Polozola III, 376 So. 2d at 1016.
54. La. R.S. 9:2780 (Supp. 1987). Louisiana's anti-indemnity statute was passed in
the summer of 1981 and became effective on September 11, 1981. The statute declares
many typical indemnity agreements in contracts for oil and gas exploration void as against
public policy. The provisions of the statute may potentially affect other cases.
55. Jennings v. Ralston Purina Co., 201 So. 2d 168, 175 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
1987]
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Co. 56 involved a contract between Texas Pipeline Company (Pipeline)
and Atlas Construction Company, Inc. (Atlas). Pipeline had leased a
tract of land with the intent of operating a crude oil storage facility.
Atlas contracted to construct three storage tank foundations. After con-
struction had begun, a roadbed on the leased premises collapsed, de-
stroying a sub-contractor's cement truck. The district court held Pipeline
strictly liable under Civil Code article 2317, but rejected its claim for
indemnification under the contract. In an evenly divided en banc decision,
the first circuit affirmed. 57 The plurality opinion reasoned that the rule
of strict construction set out in Polozola II applied to indemnification
from the indemnitee's strict liability as well as its negligence." The
supreme court reversed, 59 stating that the lower court had misinterpreted
the Polozola H rule, which "does not apply to the question of whether
the parties intended to indemnify against the indemnitee's strict liability
under Civil Code article 2317." 6
Noting the absence of express contractual language granting indem-
nification from strict liability, the court applied the general rules of
contract interpretation61 to determine the intent of the parties. Focusing
on the phrase "each and every claim, demand or cause of action and
any liability," the court concluded that the parties intended that Pipeline
be indemnified from its strict liability arising under Civil Code article
2317.62
In support of its conclusion, the court pointed out other contractual
provisions in which the indemnitor represented that it had inspected the
56. 488 So. 2d 982 (La. 1986). The indemnity clause provided:
"Contractor [Atlas] shall fully defend, protect, indemnify and hold harmless
the Company [Texas], its employees and agents from and against each and every
claim, demand or cause of action and any liability, cost, expense (including but
not limited to reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred in defense of
the Company), damage or loss in connection therewith, which may be made or
asserted by Contractor, Contractor's employees or agents, subcontractors, or
any third parties, (including but not limited to Company's agents, servants or
employees) on account of personal injury or death or property damage caused
by, arising out of, or in any way incidental to, or in connection with the
performance of the work hereunder, whether or not Company may have jointly
caused or contributed to, by its own negligence, any such claim, demand, cause
of action, liability, cost, expense, damage or loss, except as may result solely
from the Company's negligence."
Id. at 983.
57. Soverign Ins. Co. v. Texas Pipeline Co., 470 So. 2d 969 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1985).
58. Soverign, 470 So. 2d at 973-74.
59. Soverign, 488 So. 2d at 986 (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 983.
61. The court referred to La. Civ. Code arts. 1903, 1945, 1949, 1950, 1955, 1956,
1959, 1962, 1965 (1870) and La. Civ. Code arts. 13, 2045, 2046, 2050-2052, and 2055.
62. Soverign, 488 So. 2d at 985.
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premises and promised to take any measures necessary to prevent injury
to person or property. Also, the contract expressly excluded indemni-
fication from claims resulting from the indemnitee's sole negligence.
"Considering the contract as a whole, it is clear that the parties adverted
to the possibility of claims, causes of actions and judgments based upon
%strict liability for damage caused by premises hazards or defects." '63
While the court focused on the intent of the parties when interpreting
the general language, the analysis differed significantly from that in a
negligence situation. When strict liability is the issue, if the intent of
the parties is not apparent after applying the general rules of interpre-
tation, the court may then interpret the contract in light of everything
that is considered by law, custom, usages, or equity as incidental or
necessary to the contract.6 These elements "may be shown for the
purpose not only of elucidating [the contract], but also of completing
it. ' ' 65 "When there is doubt as to indemnification against an indemnitee's
own negligence liability, however, usage, custom or equity may not be
used to interpret a contract expansively in favor of the indemnitee.'' 66
This results from the Polozola II presumption: "[I]f the intention to
indemnify against an indemnitee's liability for his negligence is equivocal,
this court has established a presumption that the parties did not intend
to indemnify an indemnitee against losses resulting from his own neg-
ligent act.' '67
Logically, this distinction between situations of negligence and strict
liability is justifiable. The equity concerns that led to the Polozola II
presumption are absent where strict liability is at issue. For claims arising
under Civil Code article 2317,6 the indemnitor usually possesses pertinent
knowledge equal to the indemnitee. A contractor working daily on the
premises may, in fact, occupy a better position than the landowner to
discover the risk. 69 Additionally, indemnifying a party from liability for
dangerous things in his custody will not lead to the same "relaxation
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Southern Bitulithic Co. v. Algiers Ry. & Lighting Co., 130 La. 830,
58 So. 588 (1912)).
66. Soverign, 488 So. 2d at 985.
67. Id. at 985-86.
68. La. Civ. Code art. 2317 provides in pertinent part: "We are responsible, not
only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act
of persons for whom we are answerable, or of-the things which we have in our custody."
69. The court in Hyde v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 697 F.2d 614, 633 (5th Cir. 1983),
recognized this possibility: "There is no public policy against [making the drilling con-
tractors, rather than the operators, responsible for damage claims by workers], for the
contractors in control of the platforms are in the best position to prevent injuries to their
crews."
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of vigilance toward the rights of others ' 70 as would indemnity for his
negligent acts. Since strict liability is not based on culpability, the burden
assumed by the indemnitor is much less troublesome than it would be
if he were assuming responsibility for the indemnitee's negligence.
Although the Soverign court does not specifically so hold, one may
reach the reasonable conclusion that the general language "any and all"
claims" will be held to evidence an intent to indemnify the indemnitee
from his strict liability. In a decision preceding Soverign, the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that such language indicated
"a clear intention" to indemnify the indemnitee from any claims based
on its strict liability. 7' While it is conceivable that a court could read
such general language, and, in light of "law, custom, usages, or equity,"
fail to find an intent to indemnify an indemnitee from strict liability,
such a result seems unlikely.
Conclusion
The Soverign court made a commendable effort to clarify the rules
of judicial interpretation of indemnity clauses in those cases involving
negligence and those involving strict liability. When a -party claims
indemnification from its negligent acts, the contract must contain evi-
dence of a clear, unequivocable consent by the parties to such an
agreement. While express language is not required, mere general terms
like "any and all claims" are not sufficient to prove such intent.
The Polozola II rule dictates that when indemnification from one's
own negligence is claimed, the contract must be strictly construed. How-
ever, when indemnification from one's strict liability is claimed, the
court will look beyond the contract. This more liberal standard reflects
the difference in equitable considerations arising under negligence and
under strict liability. If, in the light of "law, custom, usages, or equity,"
general language indicates a common intention to indemnify against the
indemnitee's strict liability, relief will be granted to the indemnitee.
In theory, these interpretative rules are sound; in practice, however,
problems arise. Louisiana courts have been very reluctant to find any-
thing less than express language to be an indication of an intent to
indemnify the indemnitee from his own negligence. A careful reading
of cases like Polozola III and Jennings reveals that the courts have
relied on more than just general language and that only in exceptional
situations is express language not needed to find an "unequivocal"
intent. However, this has not discouraged the owner/indemnitee from
seeking indemnification under a clause containing the general "any and
70. Soverign, 488 So. 2d at 986.
71. Hyde, 697 F.2d at 633-35.
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all claims" language. Thus, the result has been a mass of litigation
involving apparently similar indemnity clauses, producing quite dissimilar
results.
Extensive litigation can be foreseen in light of the Soverign decision.
The contractor/indemnitor will argue that, given the "law, custom,
usages, or equity," the general language of the indemnity clause at issue
does not evidence an intent to indemnify the indemnitee from his strict
liability. Due to the sheer number of these clauses in existence, it is
very likely that eventually a court will be faced with a set of facts
under which such an argument could prevail.
Narrow exceptions serve the purpose of allowing courts to deviate
from the general interpretation in exceptional cases, but not without a
cost. Every time personal injury, death, or property damage occurs as
a result of the work performed under a contract with an indemnity
clause containing general language, a potential source of litigation arises.
In the case of negligence, a steadfast rule, requiring express contractual
reference to the indemnitee's negligence before relief is granted, should
be imposed. 72 Conversely, the broad general language "any and all
claims" should be conclusive evidence of an intent to indemnify the
indemnitee from his strict liability. Adoption of these rigid rules would
have the effect of clarifying the relationship between the parties and
putting an end to much of the litigation in this area. These rules may
initially seem harsh; however, once the law is settled sophisticated parties
will adapt. Contractors and landowners will be forced to recognize these
issues and decide them in advance by clearly expressing their intent in
the contract.
In the absence of such reform, the prudent attorney would be wise
to address these issues when drafting indemnity agreements. A simple
statement in the contract expressing the parties' intent to indemnify the
indemnitee from his negligence and strict liability can prevent needless
future litigation.
Charles M. Pisano
72. This result may be obtained in two ways: judicial interpretation and legislation.
A wide range of anti-indemnification statutes have been passed throughout the country.
For a complete summary of their contents and effects, see 3 S. Stein, Construction Law
13.17, at 13-128 to 13-143 (1986).
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